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Non-compliance with the criteria for business rescue resolution of the Companies Act, 
2008: Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel 
 
PART 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any country that has an effective and efficient business rescue procedure has a better chance 
of having a successfully growing economy. This kind of advantage is more relevant in 
developing countries, where the preservation of jobs is of primary concern.1 In South Africa, 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act”)2 introduced a new business rescue 
system to the South African law.3 Business rescue proceedings are aimed at facilitating the 
rehabilitation and restoration of a company that is financially distressed, by making provision 
for the appointment of a business rescue practitioner who facilitates temporary supervision of 
the management, financial affairs, business and assets of the company.4 Business rescue 
proceedings create a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company 
and its property.5  
 
A business rescue process subjects a company to rescue proceedings through a voluntary or a 
court process.6 This results in a moratorium that protects the company from legal actions by 
its creditors.7 The aim is to restructure the affairs of the company to maximize solvent 
existence, or better return for its creditors than that of a liquidation process. In Southern 
Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd vs Midnight Storm Investment386 Ltd,8 the court held that 
the aim of business rescue is simply to secure a better return for creditors.  
 
                                              
1 Loubser “Business rescue in South Africa: a practice in search of a home” 2013 SAMLJ 437.  
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
3 S 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act. 
4 Loubser “Judicial management as a business rescue procedure in South African corporate law” 2004 SAMLJ 
137 162. 
5 Omar “Thoughts on the purpose of corporate rescue” 1997 Journal of International Banking Law 127. 
6 Rajak and Henning “Business rescue for South Africa” 1999 SALJ 262. 
7 Rushworth “A critical analysis of the business rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 2010 Acta 
Juridica 375. 
8 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd (Registrar of Banks and 
Another Intervening) 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC). 
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In Swart v Beagles Run Investments,9 the court held that business rescue proceedings aim to 
secure a better return for creditors as an independent alternative goal that may be pursued for 
its own sake.10 The business rescue process is aimed at putting all stakeholders in a better 
position, compared to the alternative process of liquidation. The business rescue process is 
however often abused by some financially distressed corporations for the benefit of its 
moratorium on any existing legal claims against the corporation. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Some recent cases, including that of Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel,11 has started to 
reshape the statutory requirements of business rescue proceedings. The business rescue 
process is not a smooth sailing exercise. Although the requirements of business rescue 
proceedings are enshrined in section 129 of the Companies Act,12 it is unfortunate that courts 
are approached to intervene in the settlement of emerging disputes between parties. Courts 
then have to reconcile provisions of the Companies Act with various factual scenarios. This 
means that presiding officers have to apply their minds to the facts and make decisions that 
have far-reaching implications.13    
 
The broad problem statement of this dissertation is to determine how the courts can prevent 
companies from attempting to abuse the business rescue proceedings through legal 
technicalities. In making this determination, the objective of this dissertation will be to 
compare and contrast the Panamo judgments in order to highlight its practical implications. 
The dissertation will therefore deal with the practical implications of non-compliance with 
section 129(3) and (4). The purpose is to reach a conclusion on whether these practical 
implications are a beneficial development of the law.  
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The dissertation is divided into six parts. The aims of each part are as follows: 
Part one introduces the topic by giving a general introduction and a brief discussion of the 
concept “business rescue” and explaining the two methods through which business rescue 
                                              
9 Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 5 SA 422 (GNP). 
10 S 128(3)(b) of the Companies Act; Swart case (n 9). 
11 Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel and Another NNO (35/2014) 2015 ZASCA 76 (27 May 2015). 
12 S 129 of the Companies Act. 
13 Loubser (n 1) 153. 
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proceedings can commence. Part two presents a summary of the facts in the Panamo 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nel judgment. Part three contains a discussion of the legal 
development of business rescue based on various judgments. Part four contains a summary of 
the judgments by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo. Part five 
analyses these two judgments, while part six concludes the dissertation. 
 
PART 2 
 
2.1 A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BUSINESS RESCUE COMMENCEMENT 
METHODS 
Generally speaking, business rescue was introduced in our law to save viable businesses that 
are in financial distress in order to keep them in business on a solvent financial basis. There 
are two ways of initiating business rescue proceedings. Business rescue can commence by 
way of a resolution or by obtaining a court order. This paragraph will be devoted to a 
discussion of these two methods.  
 
First, attention will be given to the fundamental legal requirements for commencement of 
business rescue proceedings. The Companies Act stipulates that one of the requirements for 
initiating business rescue proceedings is that the company should be financially distressed 
and that there should be a reasonable prospect for its rescue.14 In Van Der Merwe and Others 
v Zonnekus Mansion,15 the court held that a company is regarded as being “financially 
distressed” if it appears that it will not reasonably be able to make payment of all its liabilities 
when they become due and payable in the immediate ensuing six months, or if it appears that 
the company is reasonably likely to become insolvent in the next six months.16 
 
2.1.1 Commencement by resolution 
When commencing business rescue by a resolution, the board should consider whether there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the 
company.17 Without reasonable prospects of a successful business rescue it means 
commencing business rescue proceedings will be a futile exercise. If the board believes that 
                                              
14 S 129(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. 
15 Van der Merwe and Others v Zonnekus Mansion (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 5 SA 422 (GP). 
16 Van der Merwe case (n 15); s 128(1)(f) of the Companies Act. 
17 S 129(1)(b) of the Companies Act. 
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there are reasonable prospects to rescue the company, they must pass a resolution by a 
majority vote that the rescue proceedings should begin and that the company should be 
placed under the supervision of a business rescue practitioner.18  
 
The Companies Act imposes restrictions when passing a resolution to commence business 
rescue proceedings. The proceedings may not commence if liquidation proceedings have 
been initiated by or against the company.19 In addition, the resolution to commence the 
proceedings will have no force until it has been filed at the Companies Commission, in the 
manner and form prescribed.20  
 
After adopting the resolution, the board must file the resolution with the Commission within 
five days.21 Extensions of time limits are granted upon application to the Commission. The 
company must then publish a notice of the resolution to every affected person, with a sworn 
statement of the facts relevant to the grounds in respect of which the board’s resolution was 
adopted.22 A qualified business rescue practitioner who satisfies the requirements of section 
138 must be appointed to oversee the company during the rescue proceedings. The 
practitioner must have consented in writing to the appointment.23 The company must file the 
notice of the appointment of the practitioner within two business days after his appointment.24 
The copy of the notice of his appointment must be published to all affected persons within 
five days after filing.25 
 
If a company fails to comply with any of the above mentioned requirements, its resolution to 
begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision lapses and will 
be null and void.26 The company may not file another resolution for a period of three months 
after the date on which the lapsed resolution was adopted, unless a court, on good cause and 
by means of ex parte application, approves the company filing another resolution.27 
 
                                              
18 S 129(1)(b) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 377. 
19 S 129(2)(a) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7)  377. 
20 S 129(2)(b) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7)  378. 
21 S 129(3) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 378. 
22 S 129(3)(a) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7)  378. 
23 S 129(3)(b) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 379. 
24 S 129(4)(a) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 379. 
25 S 129(4)(b) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7)  379. 
26 S 129(5)(a) of the Companies Act. 
27 S 129(5)(b) of the Companies Act. 
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2.1.2 Commencement by court order 
According to the Companies Act, unless the company has adopted a resolution to begin 
business rescue proceedings, an affected person may apply to a court for an order to 
commence business rescue proceedings.28 The applicant must serve a copy of the notice of 
motion on the company and the Commission. All affected persons must also be notified.29 
Each affected person has a right to participate in the proceedings if they so wish. 
 
The court, after considering the application, may make an order to place the company under 
supervision and to commence business rescue proceedings, if it is satisfied that the company 
is financially distressed.30 The court may make an order if it is of the view that the company 
has failed to pay an amount due and payable under a public regulation or under a contract, in 
respect of employment matters.31 The court will also grant the order if it is otherwise just and 
equitable to do so for financial reasons.32 In respect of each of the above grounds, the court 
must also be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that the goals of the business rescue 
proceedings will be achieved. If the court is not satisfied that the requirements above have 
been met, or it is under the impression that there are no reasonable prospects to rescue the 
company, the court has a discretion to dismiss the application altogether and place the 
company under liquidation.33 
 
An application for business rescue can even be pursued in instances where liquidation 
proceedings have commenced, provided that business rescue would yield better results than 
liquidation. In Newcity Group v Allan David Pellow NO,34 the court held that a court may not 
grant an application for business rescue unless there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the 
company by facilitating its rehabilitation so that it continues on a solvent basis or, if that is 
not possible, the rescue should yield a better return for its creditors and shareholders than it 
would through liquidation. 
 
                                              
28 S 131(1) of the Companies Act. 
29 S 131(1) of the Companies Act. 
30 S 131(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act. 
31 S 131(4)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
32 S 131(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
33 S 131(4)(b) of the Companies Act. 
34 Newcity Group (Pty) Limited v Pellow NO and Others (577/2013) 2014 ZASCA 162 (1 October 2014). 
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In AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others,35 
amongst the applicant’s prayers was a request for the postponement of the business rescue 
proceedings to afford the applicant an opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit that 
would address the reasonable prospects of rescuing the company. The court emphasized that 
addressing the issues of reasonable prospects when applying for business rescue is of 
significant importance. The applicant’s heads of argument did not contain any averments 
addressing the issues of reasonable prospects. The court therefore held that, before a court 
can make the rescue order, which would give rise to the practitioner’s opportunity to work 
out a rescue plan, it must be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the 
company. 
 
In Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products CC,36 the applicant, as the only member of the close 
corporation in liquidation, approached the court as an affected person in terms of section 131 
(4) of the Act, for an order to initiate business rescue. The court, in granting the order, held 
that the applicant had proved on a balance of probabilities that the proceedings were unlikely 
to prejudice creditors and would place all the stakeholders in a better position than if the 
business was liquidated. 
 
According to the Companies Act, if the court grants an order to commence the business 
rescue proceedings, it may also grant an order appointing an interim business rescue 
practitioner who meets the requirements of section 38 of the Companies Act and nominated 
by the affected person who applied for the order to commence the rescue proceedings. The 
shareholders with majority voting interests must ratify the appointment of the practitioner.37 
The court may, after considering an application, dismiss it or grant it. If the application is 
dismissed, the court may make other orders, for instance, placing the company under 
liquidation.38 
 
According to the Act, if liquidation proceedings have already commenced by the time an 
affected person applies for an order to commence rescue proceedings, the liquidation 
proceeding will be stayed until the court has heard the business rescue application. If the 
                                              
35 AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) 
Ltd and Another Intervening) 2012 5 SA 515 (GSJ). 
36 Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products CC (In Liquidation) 2013 4 SA 630 (GNP) 32. 
37 S 131(5) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 380. 
38 S 131(4)(b) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 381. 
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court makes the order to begin the business rescue proceedings, the liquidation proceedings 
will be suspended until the business rescue proceedings end.39 In ABSA Bank Ltd v Summer 
Lodge (Pty) Ltd, ABSA Bank Ltd v JVL Beleggings (Pty) Ltd, ABSA Bank Ltd v Earthquake 
Investments (Pty) Ltd,40 the applicant applied for the liquidation of the three respondents who 
were all hopelessly insolvent. On the day of the hearing, an application to place the company 
under business rescue was brought by the affected person in terms of section 131 of the Act. 
The court was then asked to suspend the liquidation proceedings, as per section 131(6) of the 
Act. Van der Bijl AJ concluded that: 
 
“What section 131(6) means is that once liquidation proceedings have commenced by 
the granting of a liquidation order, whether provisional or final, the mere issue and 
service of a business rescue application would suspend the liquidation process?”41 
 
PART 3 
 
3.1 BRIEF DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS LEGAL CASES PRIOR TO PANAMO 
Prior to the Panamo judgment, there were a number of decisions that dealt with the issues 
and arguments raised in that case. For purposes of this discussion, only a few cases will be 
discussed that highlight the problem of the abuse of business rescue and how different courts 
ruled in those cases.  
 
In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd,42 
Oakdene Square Properties was the first appellant who brought the application for business 
rescue. It alleged that it was an affected person, i.e. the creditor of the company and thus had 
locus standi to bring the proceedings. Educated Risk Investments was the second appellant 
and a shareholder with 40 percent interests in Oakdene.43 Two brothers, Dimetry Theodosiuo 
and Antonys Theodosiuo, were third and fourth appellants respectively who had interests in 
both Oakdene and Educated Risk Investments.44  The first respondent was the company, farm 
Bothasfontein. The second Respondent was Nedbank Ltd and the third was Imperial 
                                              
39 S 131(6) of the Companies Act; Rushworth (n 7) 381. 
40 2014 3 SA 90 (GP), par 18. 
41 2014 3 SA 90 (GP), par 19. 
42 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd (609/2012) [2013] ZASCA 
68. 
43 Oakdene case (n 42) par 2. 
44 Oakdene case (n 42) par 3. 
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Holdings Ltd. The appellants applied for an order to commence business rescue proceedings. 
At the time the application was made, the company, Bothasfontein farm owed Nedbank 
R31.5 million, interests and legal costs.45 There was already a warrant of sale in execution 
against the company’s immovable property by Nedbank. 
 
The appellants in bringing the business rescue application alleged in their papers that a forced 
sale of the immovable property would be detrimental to the shareholders and the creditors of 
the company.46 They alleged that a forced sale would realise an amount not more than R120 
million, however a normal sale will realise more than R300 million as appraised by their 
experts.47 The respondents alleged that the company’s property was not worth more than 
R129 million and its debts was amounting to R75 million.48  
 
The respondent brought the application for business rescue on the basis that it would yield 
better returns than liquidation on the following grounds: (a) the business rescue practitioner 
would sell the property at a higher price than the liquidator; (b) the costs of a business rescue 
practitioner would be lower than those of a liquidator; and (c) that the sale of half the farm 
would be sufficient to pay Nedbank which would leave the remaining half of the farm 
available for the business rescue practitioner to trade with.49 
 
In dismissing the application, the court held that the company’s proposal that a business 
rescue practitioner should sell the property rather than a liquidator was just an alternative 
informal way of winding up a company. The court held that business rescue was not a 
replacement method of winding up a company without the effects of liquidation proceedings. 
The SCA upheld the decision of the court a quo that business rescue proceedings were not 
appropriate in these circumstances and the appeal was dismissed in favour of Nedbank. 
This case shows how easily business rescue can be abused by opportunistic persons who seek 
protection of the moratorium for their own private interests. It is clear from the judgment that 
the business rescue procedure should only be utilized to achieve the objectives of business 
rescue. This case shows a clear indication that utilizing business rescue proceedings as an 
                                              
45 Oakdene case (n 42) par 4. 
46 Oakdene case (n 42) par 4. 
47 Oakdene case (n 42) par 15. 
48 Oakdene case (n 42) par 16. 
49 Oakdene case (n 42) par 17. 
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alternative method of winding up a company in order to avoid the legitimate consequences of 
a liquidation procedure, conflicts with the goals of business rescue.50 
 
The Oakdene case is a good example that courts will avoid granting business rescue orders 
where the benefits of doing so are outweighed by liquidation proceedings. The case illustrates 
how the court can intervene and safeguard the interests of creditors – by thoroughly 
discussing the requirements for business rescue, indicating how it should be applied, and by 
dismissing the application if there has been an abuse of the process. 
 
In Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd and Others,51 the creditors of the company 
as affected persons opposed the application for business rescue on the grounds that the 
applicant intended to use the business rescue proceedings as a protection blanket to avoid and 
postpone the payment of its creditors. The court agreed and dismissed the application. 
 
In Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 
(Registrar of Banks and Another Intervening),52 the court held that the directors of the 
company should not use business rescue proceedings to immunise themselves against the 
actions of their creditors in order to pursue their own private interests. 
 
In Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd (Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd 
Intervening); Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) 
Ltd,53 the court was not prepared to give the developers any leeway without a bona fide 
workable restructuring plan, given that rescue proceedings could lend themselves to abuse by 
company insiders seeking to use these provisions to frustrate creditors’ rights and to stave off 
liquidation for motives of their own. 
 
In ABSA Bank Ltd v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd, the court held that the timing of the application 
for business rescue by the applicant was a clear indication that the process was intended to be 
used as a mechanism to paralyze the liquidation procedure and that the applicants intended to 
abuse and manipulate the business rescue procedure.54 The court dismissed the application. 
                                              
50 Oakdene case (n 42) par 29. 
51 2011 5 SA 422 (GNP) (n 10) par 5. 
52 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC) (n 8) par 7. 
53 2012 ZAWCHC 33 (WCC). 
54 2012 ZAGPJHC 144 (GSJ). 
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In Madodza (Pty) Ltd (In Business Rescue) v ABSA Bank Ltd,55 a business rescue practitioner 
was not appointed within 5 business days after filing the resolution. The court held that the 
resolution automatically lapsed and was a nullity and that no condonation or substantial 
compliance was possible.  
 
PART 4 
 
4.1 CASE OF PANAMO PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD V NEL  
 
4.1.1 The facts  
This is an appeal case against an order and judgment of the North Gauteng High Court. Jan 
Nel Trust (“the Trust”) was the sole shareholder of the first appellant, Panamo Properties 
(Pty) Ltd (“Panamo”). Its trustees, Mr. and Mrs. Nel (“trustees”), were the first and second 
respondents respectively, and they were also the directors of Panamo. The trustees were 
acting in their representative capacities as directors, on behalf of the trust, in the proceedings. 
Panamo was a property-owning company that owned a large immovable property in 
Roodepoort. The trustees’ home was situated on a portion of the property in question. The 
balance of the property was let to various commercial tenants. The property was mortgaged 
in favor of the First Rand Bank Ltd (“the FRB”). Panamo fell into arrears and a default 
judgment was obtained against the company for a total amount of R3.3 million, plus interest 
and legal costs. The property in question was therefore declared executable, as FRB had 
already issued a writ against the property.56 
 
In an attempt to prevent the execution of the property and afford the trustees time to resolve 
Panamo’s financial problems, the Trust resolved on 18 August 2011 to place Panamo under 
business rescue. A sworn statement and a resolution were filed with the third respondent, the 
Commission.57 The affected persons were notified of the resolution to commence business 
rescue proceedings on the 19th of August 2011 with a letter. On the 26th of October 2011, the 
Commission issued a certificate confirming that the second appellant, Van der Merwe (“the 
                                              
55 2012 (GNP Case 38906/12) 38.  
56 Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel and Another NNO (56399/2013) 2015 ZAHC 76 (26 September 2013). 
57 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 1. 
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business rescue practitioner”), was appointed to act on behalf of Panamo.58 On the 28th 
October 2011, a notice of Panamo’s business rescue practitioner was filed with the 
Commission. 
 
On the 24th April 2012, as part of the business rescue plan and in pursuance of the approved 
business rescue plan, the trustees sold Panamo’s immovable property, situated at Honeydew 
to the fourth respondent, Trevor Payne.59 The business rescue practitioner further initiated the 
payment of the rates and taxes that were outstanding on the property. The hold on the 
transaction by the South African Revenue Services (“SARS”) for Panamo’s outstanding taxes 
was to be uplifted in a short period of time.60 
 
More than two years later, in September 2013, the Trust sought an order declaring that the 
original resolution to place Panamo in business rescue had lapsed, and consequently the 
entire business rescue process was a nullity and an order declaring the appointment of the 
business rescue practitioner was void.61 It was undisputed that the sole purpose of the 
application was to prevent the sale of the property and to prolong the trustee’s occupation of 
their home. In advancing its case, the Trust relied on its failure and the failure of the trustees, 
as the moving spirits behind both the Trust and Panamo, to comply with the various 
requirements prescribed by section 129(3) and (4) of the Act.62 The basis for the application 
in the high court was as follows: 
 
“[71] The resolution to begin business rescue proceedings and place First Respondent under 
supervision lapsed and is a nullity for the reasons that: 
 
[7.1.1] the notice of the resolution that was sent to the affected persons within five days of the 
adoption and filing of the resolution was not accompanied by the sworn statement; 
furthermore, it was 
 
[7.1.2] not published as required in terms of section 129 (3) (b). The letter sent by the 1st 
Respondent’s Attorneys on the 19th of October 2011 purporting to give notice to the affected 
parties is not a publication, as required by the Act. 
                                              
58 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 4. 
59 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 5. 
60 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 6. 
61 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 6.  
62 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 4. 
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[7.1.3] the business rescue practioner was not appointed in terms of the specified periods, as 
stipulated in  section 129 (3) (b) of the Act. 
 
[7.7] when the 2nd Respondent was issued with a registration certificate to act as the 1st 
respondent’s business rescue practitioner on 26 October 2011, five (5) days had already 
elapsed by the 28th of October 2011, eight (8) days after the resolution was filed.”63 
 
4.2 Judgment of the High Court 
The High Court was tasked with the responsibility of determining if there was indeed non-
compliance with the provisions of section 129(3) and (4) of the Companies Act, and the 
implication of a resolution that lapsed as a result of such non-compliance. Whether the 
provisions of section 130(1), (2) and (5) of the Companies Act should be invoked and 
whether the trustees were eligible to bring up such proceedings, according to the provisions 
of section 130(1) of the Companies Act.64 
 
In interpreting these provisions, the court’s approach was very restrictive by only focusing on 
the literal meaning of the provisions. Khumalo J held that the appointment of Panamo’s 
business rescue practitioner was filed with the Commission two days following the issuing of 
his registration certificate. The filing was eight days late from the date the resolution was 
filed. The delay resulted in non-compliance with the above provisions.65 It was held that the 
resolution to commence business rescue was not accompanied by a sworn statement of the 
facts relevant to the grounds on which the resolution was founded. It was further held that the 
trustees were therefore in contravention of section 129(3)(a) of the Companies Act, which is 
rigid when it comes to procedural compliance. 
 
The court held that the trustees’ allegation that the notice of the appointment of the business 
rescue practitioner to affected persons was not published in a manner required by section 
129(3)(a), was not quite accurate. It held that according regulation 7 and section 6(10) and 
(11) referred to in regulation 23, that the delivery of a copy of the notice to each affected 
person includes any delivery of the notice of the availability of the document with an 
instruction for receiving a complete document.  
                                              
63 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 7. 
64 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 17. 
65 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 25. 
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Regulation 7 provides: 
 
“A notice or document to be delivered for any purpose contemplated in the Act or these 
regulations may be delivered in any manner- 
(a) Contemplated in section 6 (10) or (11); or 
(b) Set out in Table CR.3.” 
 
Section 6(10) provides:  
 
“If, in terms of the Act, a notice is required or permitted to be given or published to 
any person, it is sufficient if the notice is transmitted electronically, directly to the 
person in a manner and form such that the notice can conveniently be printed by the 
recipient within a reasonable time and costs.” 
 
Section 6(11)(b)(ii) provides: 
 
“If, in terms of the Act, a document, record or statement, other than a notice 
contemplated in subsection (10) is required to be published, provided or delivered, it 
is sufficient if a notice of the availability of that document, record or statement, 
summarizing its content and satisfying any prescribed requirement, is delivered to 
each intended recipient of the document, record or statement, together with 
instructions for receiving the complete document, record or statement.”66 
 
In support of abovementioned regulation 7, the court concurred with Rautenbach AJ in Ex 
Parte: Van den Steen NO,67 with reference to section 6(9) and further indicated that 
compliance with regard to publication of a notice to affected persons required by the 
Companies Act is accommodative to substantial compliance and not as stringent as it is 
perceived to be by section 129.68 
 
 
 
                                              
66 As quoted in Panamo HC case (n 56) par 21. 
67 2014 6 SA 29 (GJ) (27 February 2013). 
68 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 23. 
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4.2.1 The implication of a resolution that lapses and is a nullity 
According to Khumalo J, the resolution to begin business rescue proceedings and place the 
company under supervision had lapsed and was therefore a nullity. It was held that the 
meaning of “lapse” and “nullity” in relation to the resolution should be interpreted according 
to the objectives of the Act, which provides in section 129(2) that the resolution has no force 
or effect until it has been filed with CIPCSA. In addition, section 132(1)(a) provides that 
business rescue proceedings begin when the company files a resolution to place itself under 
supervision in terms of section 129(3).69 In terms of section 129(2), the resolution comes into 
force and effect on its filing and lapses when subsection 3 is not complied with.70 The 
resolution’s effectiveness to trigger or cause the business rescue proceedings to begin 
becomes a nullity; in other words, it will not cause the commencement of the business rescue 
proceedings, and in that sense becomes a nullity. The end result is that the business rescue 
proceedings does not commence.71 
 
4.2.2 Whether the provisions of section 130 (1), (2) and (5) can be invoked? 
The High Court held that section 132 refers to section 129(3) and not to section 129(2), 
for the proceedings to begin. The lapsed resolution had caused an invalidity that prevented 
the business rescue proceedings from commencing. This conclusion has serious implications 
for invoking the other provisions of the Companies Act.72 Therefore, there could not be an 
application in terms of section 130 to set aside a non-existent resolution that amounts to 
nothing.73 
 
4.2.3 Whether the trustees were eligible to bring an application in terms of section 130 
(1) of the Companies Act 
The Trust argued that it was not obliged to follow the route of an application to court under 
section 130(1)(a)(iii) because such a challenge was unnecessary in the light of section 
129(5)(a). The Trust contended that the effect of its non-compliance with the provisions of 
sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 129 was that the resolution commencing business rescue 
proceedings in relation to the Panamo had lapsed and become a nullity, thereby bringing the 
                                              
69 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 24. 
70 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 26. 
71 Bradstreet “The new business rescue: will creditors sink or swim?” 2011 SALJ 352. 
72 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 28. 
73 Bradstreet “The leak in the chapter 6 lifeboat - inadequate regulation of business rescue practitioners may 
adversely affect lenders’ willingness and the growth of the economy” 2010 SAMLJ 195. 
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business rescue proceedings to an end. This was so irrespective of the fact that non-
compliance flowed from the Trust’s own failures to comply with these requirements and 
without any need to invoke the provisions of section 130. 74 
 
The High Court held that the trustees carried the responsibility as directors, for the proper 
management of the business, making sure that an appropriate assessment was made on the 
viability of the company and proper measures were correctly taken on time, to deal with the 
situation.75 Khumalo J noted that the trustees were all aware of what was expected of them by 
the Companies Act as deduced from their letter and sworn statement made on 15 September 
2011 that spelled out the exact process to be followed. Nevertheless, they failed to comply 
with the process, prejudicing the innocent parties that were strung along in the defective 
process that they believed to be genuine.76 Therefore, the trustees had delayed in launching 
this application and were now doing so, as conceded, only for selfish reasons, when they 
realized that it would not be possible to stop the imminent transfer of the property to the 5th 
Respondent. They went further than placing the business under business rescue and voted in 
favour of the business rescue plan that included the sale of the immovable property that now 
prompted the present application to nullify the process.  
 
In reaching his conclusion regarding costs, Khumalo J held that it would consequently be 
ludicrous for either the business rescue practitioner or Panamo to be placed in this precarious 
position and then be saddled with costs, especially the business rescue practitioner. His 
opposition of the application was bona fide, believing that section 130(2) might be applicable 
and labouring under the mistaken belief that he was acting in the best interest of the creditors. 
It was held that the trustees’ actions led to the company’s detriment with a disastrous 
outcome.77 After considering all the submissions above, the High Court declared the business 
rescue proceedings non-existent and the appointment of the business rescue practitioner 
void.78 
 
 
                                              
74 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 31. 
75 Panamo HC case  (n 56) par 32; see Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South Africa 
LLD thesis: SA case (2010) 71. 
76 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 33. 
77 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 36. 
78 Panamo HC case (n 56) par 38. 
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4.3 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the business rescue proceedings, under the 
Companies Act, is intended to provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially 
distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders.79 During business rescue proceedings, there is a temporary moratorium on the 
rights of claimants against the company. In addition, its affairs are restructured through the 
development of a business rescue plan, aimed at the company continuing its operations on a 
solvent basis, or if that is unattainable, leading to a better result for the company’s creditors 
and shareholders than would otherwise be the case.80 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated that business rescue goals and objectives are being 
hampered because the statutory provisions are not clearly drafted. The provisions lead to 
confusion and opens the door to possible exploitation due to its inconsistencies and advance 
technical arguments intended to stultify the business rescue process or safeguarding 
advantages not envisaged by its broad purpose.81 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal shared the sentiment of the High Court that the demeanour of 
the Trust was very opportunistic in that they strung along the other parties including the 
practitioner to the business rescue proceedings and delayed bringing the application to court 
until they realised there was no other way of avoiding or preventing the transfer of the 
immovable property to the purchaser. The court went further to describe the conduct as a 
stratagem involving a wholly undesirable exploitation of legal technicalities for their own 
advantage.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that the obvious and sensible meaning of the 
expression, “procedural requirements”, in section 130(1)(a)(iii) is that it refers to the 
procedural requirements in subsections 129(3) and (4). However, if the resolution lapses and 
becomes a nullity because of non-compliance, and brings an end to the business rescue 
process, as has been held in the High Court judgment, no purpose would be served by a 
provision that empowers a court to set it aside.82 
 
                                              
79 S 7(2)(k) of the Companies Act.  
80 S 128(b) of the Companies Act.  
81 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 1. 
82 Panamo SCA (n 11) par 24. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the language of section 129(5)(a), at first reading, 
may suggest that there is an absolute and immediate nullity of the resolution if there is non-
compliance with the requirements of subsections 129(3) and (4). How, then, is a court to deal 
with the anomaly that such a reading appears to create? In the court’s view, the problem 
should be solved by considering basic principles of statutory interpretation.83 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that non-compliance with the procedural requirements of 
section 123(3) and (4) does not result in automatically nullity of the business rescue 
procedure, notwithstanding the provisions of section 129(5). Business rescue proceedings 
will only be terminated when a court sets the resolution aside. A court will only set the 
resolution aside and terminate the business rescue proceedings if it is satisfied that, in the 
light of all the facts, it is just and equitable to do so.84  
 
4.4 Analysis of the judgments 
In analysing the two judgments, this paragraph will compare how the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal addressed the following issues: 
 
a. Whether non-compliance with the requirements of section 129(3) and (4) is a ground for 
bringing an application to set aside the resolution, in terms of section 130 of the Act; 
 
b. Whether a company’s non-compliance with the requirements of section 129(3) and (4) of 
the Act automatically results in the business rescue being terminated; 
 
c. Whether the court will only set aside such a resolution if it is otherwise just and equitable 
to do so, in terms of section 130(5) of the Act; and 
 
d. Whether the business rescue proceedings terminate in terms of section 132(2)(a)(i) of the 
Act once an order setting aside the resolution has been granted. 
 
With respect to the first issue, dealing with whether the non-compliance of the provisions of 
section 129(3) and (4) was a ground for bringing an application to set aside the resolution in 
terms of section 130 of the Companies Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
                                              
83 Panamo SCA (n 11) par 25. 
84 S 130(5)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
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application was brought after the adoption of the business rescue plan, which would not be 
permissible in an application under section 130. It further held that in substance, if not form, 
the trustees as the directors of the Panamo, passed the resolution to place it under business 
rescue and also brought the application to set it aside. They would not have been entitled to 
bring an application under section 130. It is therefore an open question whether section 
130(2) would permit them to do so by making the Trust the applicant, rather than 
themselves.85  
 
The court held that if they were permitted an opportunity to do so, that would conflict with 
the underlying purpose of section 130(2), which stipulates that those who place the company 
in business rescue should not be entitled to challenge that decision simply because it no 
longer suits their personal interests. Assuming that they could nonetheless bring an 
application, this is undoubtedly a factor that would have weighed heavily for a court faced 
with such an application, in considering what was just and equitable under section 
130(5)(a)(ii).86 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that arguments such as those raised in this case have 
featured in a number of decisions of the High Court, for example the case of Advanced 
Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd v Aeronautique et Technologies 
Embarquées SAS,87 where Fabricius J concluded that:  
 
“It is clear from the relevant sections contained in chapter 6 that a substantial degree of 
urgency is envisaged once a company has decided to adopt the resolution beginning rescue 
proceedings. The purpose of section 129(5) is very plain and blunt. There can be no argument 
that substantial compliance can ever be sufficient in the given context. If there is non-
compliance with section 129(3) or (4), the relevant resolution lapses and becomes a nullity. 
There is no other way out, and no question of any condonation or argument pertaining to 
''substantial compliance.”88 
                                              
85 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 15. 
86 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 15. 
87 Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd v Aeronautique ET Technologies Embarquées 
SAS (GNP cases no 72522/11). The decision was followed in Madodza (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v ABSA 
Bank Ltd (GNP Case 38906/12), Homez Trailers and Bodies (Pty) Ltd (under supervision) v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd (GNP case no 35201/2013) and ABSA Bank Ltd v Ikageng Construction (Pty) Ltd (GNP Case 
no 61235/2014). In Newton Global Trading (Pty) Ltd v Corte [2014] ZAGPPHC 628 par 12 it was held that the 
nullity dates back to the date of the original resolution and could not be remedied by a further resolution.   
88 Advanced Technologies case (n 87) par 17. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo further held that, although Fabricius J did not say 
so expressly, the learned judge appeared to be of the view that an inevitable consequence of 
the resolution having lapsed is that the business rescue process was terminated. The Court 
held that, although this approach has been followed in several other cases including the 
present one, it has not, however, been universally accepted.  
 
In Ex Parte Van den Steen NO,89 Rautenbach AJ held that Fabricius J only dealt with non-
compliance with time limits regarding the appointment of a business rescue practitioner and 
not the other aspects of sub-sections (3) and (4). He accordingly held that, where there had 
been substantial compliance with those provisions, section 129(5) did not operate to nullify 
the resolution. In ABSA Bank v Caine NO90 Daffue J pointed out that Fabricius J had not 
given consideration to the provisions of section 130(1)(a)(iii) and that his construction led to 
anomalies between section 129 and section 130.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo confirmed that the reflection by Daffue J in ABSA 
Bank v Caine NO,91 is undoubtedly correct. It echoes the approach in the following passage 
from Henochsberg,92 where the author identified the very type of problem that has arisen in 
the present case: 
 
“The practical consequences of the resolution that “lapses and is a nullity” are 
uncertain … From the wording of the section it would appear that the resolution 
lapses and becomes a nullity automatically, without any intervention from outside 
parties. From a practical perspective, this could create a number of problems, 
especially if this has been done intentionally by the company in order to gain the 
protection of Chapter 6 for a brief period of time, only to exit the procedure due to the 
resolution lapsing and becoming a nullity at a later date. This could also have 
unintended consequences where non-compliance with the notice and publication 
requirements have been minor and unintentional … It is not clear whether non-
compliance in such circumstances means that the business rescue process lapses and 
                                              
89 Ex Parte Van den Steen NO (Credit Suisse Group AG Intervening) 2014 6 SA 29 (GJ); MAN Financial 
Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Blouwater Boerdery CC (GNP case no 72522/2012).   
90 ABSA Bank Ltd v Caine NO and In Re: Absa Bank Ltd v Caine NO 2014 ZAFSHC 46 par 24 to 26. 
91 Subramanien “Ground-breaking judgement as court clarifies the procedural requirements in section 129 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008: Panamo Properties v Nel NNO 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA)” 2017 Obiter 210. 
92 Delport and Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of (2008) (loose leaf, Issue 9) 461. 
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becomes a nullity, even if the business rescue plan has already been adopted and is in 
the process of being implemented.”93 
 
According to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Panamo, the High Court had erred in following 
Fabricius J’s approach in that it appeared to leave no room for the operation of section 130(1) 
(a)(iii) that states that there is no point in bringing an application to set aside a resolution on 
the grounds of non-compliance with the procedural requirements of section 129, if that 
resolution has already lapsed and been rendered a nullity, and the process of business rescue 
had, as a result, come to an end. In order to address this problem, counsel submitted that 
section 129(5)(a) deals with non-compliance with the requirements of section 129(3) and (4), 
while section 130(1)(a)(iii) operates in respect of non-compliance with other procedural 
requirements in section 129.94 
 
On the second issue regarding whether the non-compliance of a company with further 
requirements of section 129(3) and (4) of the Act automatically results in the business rescue 
being terminated, the Supreme Court of Appeal overruled the High Court’s ruling. Khumalo J 
held that the Companies Act was rigid when it comes to non-compliance with the statutory 
injunction of section 129(3) and (4) which resulted in the business rescue proceedings lapsing 
and becoming null. In overruling Khumalo J’s contention, the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that the language of section 129(5)(a), at first glance, may suggest that there is an absolute 
and immediate nullity of the resolution if there is non-compliance with the requirements of 
section 129(3) and (4).95 However, in resolving the anomalies created by this approach, one 
should have regard to the basic principles of statutory interpretation.96 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal ventured to summarize and follow the approach to statutory interpretation as set out 
in the Endumeni case:97 
 
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, 
be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the 
context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the 
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. 
                                              
93 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 20. 
94 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 21. 
95 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 26. 
96 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 26. 
97 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2013 ZASCA 13; 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA); 2012 
2 All SA 262 9 SCA par 18. 
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Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language 
used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the 
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material 
known to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is 
possible, each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The 
process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that 
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of 
the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute 
what they regard as reasonable, sensible or business like for the words actually used. 
To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between 
interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context, it is to make a contract for the 
parties other than the one they in fact made. The ‘inevitable point of departure is the 
language of the provision itself’, read in context and having regard to the purpose of 
the provision and the background to the preparation and production of the document.” 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that when a problem such as the present one arose, the 
court must consider whether there is a better interpretation of the provisions that can assist to 
avoid the anomalies. In doing so, the court will take it upon itself to give meaning to the 
wording of the provisions and may not lightly construe any provision as having no practical 
effect.98 Secondly if the provisions of the statute that appear to conflict with one another are 
capable of being reconciled, then they should be reconciled.99 
 
When it comes to whether the business rescue is terminated in terms of section 132(2)(a)(i) 
of the Act once an order setting aside the resolution has been granted, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that section 132(2)(a)(i) provides that business rescue proceedings end when the 
court sets aside the resolution that initiated those proceedings. Therefore, when a court grants 
an order in terms of section 130(5)(a) of the Act, the effect of that order is not merely to set 
the resolution aside, but to terminate the business rescue proceedings. A fortiori it follows 
that until this has occurred, even if the business rescue resolution has lapsed and becomes a 
nullity, in terms of section 129(5)(a), the business rescue that was commenced by that 
                                              
98 Attorney-General, Transvaal v Additional Magistrate for Johannesburg 1924 SCA 421 at 436; and 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund 1984 1 SA 672 (SCA) at 678C - F.  
99 Minister of Interior v Estate Roos 1956 2 SA 266 (SCA) at 271B-C; and Amalgamated Packaging Industries 
Ltd v Hutt 1975 4 SA 943 (SCA) at 949H. 
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resolution is not terminated.100 He was of the view that the assumption underpinning the 
various high court judgments, including the High Court’s decision in this matter, to the effect 
that the lapsing of the resolution terminates the business rescue process, is inconsistent with 
the specific provisions of the Act, while none of the other judgments referred to section 
132(2)(a)(i) either.101 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that if there is non-compliance with the 
procedures of business rescue, the resolution lapses and becomes a nullity, and is liable to be 
set aside under section 130(1)(a)(iii). In all cases, the court must be approached for an order 
to set the resolution aside and to terminate business rescue. This avoids the absurdity that 
would otherwise arise if trivial non-compliance with a time period occurred. For example, the 
late appointment of the business rescue practitioner as a result of failure by the Commission 
to license the practitioner timeously in terms of section 138(2) of the Companies Act should 
not bring about the termination of the business rescue, only genuine issues to be determined 
by the court, such as whether there is financial distress or if the company is capable of being 
rescued, should have such effect.102 The reason for wanting consistency in all instances where 
the question of setting aside a resolution to commence business rescue arises, is apparent 
from section 130(5)(a) of the Act. That section deals with the circumstances in which the 
court may set aside a resolution:  
 
“(5) When considering an application in terms of subsection (1) (a) to set aside the 
company’s resolution, the court may—  
(a) set aside the resolution—  
(i) on any grounds set out in subsection (1); or  
(ii) if, having regard to all the evidence, the court considers that it is otherwise just 
and equitable to do so.”103 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that it does not agree with the notion in DH Brothers 
Industries that the effect of the inclusion of sub-par (ii) in the above section is to introduce a 
fourth ground for setting aside a resolution to commence business rescue, in addition to those 
                                              
100 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 28. 
101 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 28. 
102 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 29. 
103 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 30. 
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set out in section 130(1)(a).104 The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that in Barlin v 
Licencing Court for the Cape,105 the legislation used the disjunctive word “or”, where the 
provisions were to be read conjunctively while the word “and” would have been more 
appropriate.106 The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that were the word “or” to be given 
a disjunctive meaning, it would lead to inconsistency between the two subsections. Thus, it is 
appropriate to read it conjunctively as if it were “and”. This had the effect of reconciling 
section 130(1)(a) and section 130(5)(a) and limiting the grounds upon which an application 
to set aside a resolution can be brought. Furthermore, the discretion conferred on the court as 
to whether the resolution should be set aside, has to be exercised on the grounds of justice 
and equity in the light of all the evidence available.107 
 
Insofar as it may be suggested that the use of the word “otherwise” in section 130(5)(a)(ii) 
points in favour of this, furnishing a separate substantive ground for setting aside the 
resolution, Wallis J does not agree with this view. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
word is used in this context to convey that, over and above establishing one or more of the 
grounds set out in section 130(1)(a), the court needs to be satisfied that in light of all the 
facts, it is just and equitable to set the resolution aside and terminate the business rescue. It is 
not being used in contradistinction to the statutory grounds, but as an addition thereto. This is 
consistent with the meaning of “with regard to other points”, as given in the Oxford English 
Dictionary.108 
 
In finding that the High Court erred in its approach, the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised 
the following reasons: 
 
“…further point in favour of this approach is that it largely precludes litigants, 
whether shareholders and directors of the company or creditors, from exploiting 
technical issues in order to subvert the business rescue process or turn it to their own 
advantage. Once it is recognized that the resolution may be set aside and the business 
rescue terminated if that is just and equitable, the scope for raising technical grounds 
to avoid business rescue will be markedly restricted even if it does not vanish 
                                              
104 DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 1 All SA 173; 2014 1 SA 103 (KZP). 
105 Barlin v Licencing Court for the Cape 1924 SCA 472, 478. 
106 Ngcobo v Salimba CC; Ngcobo v Van Rensburg 1999 2 SA 1057 (SCA) par 11; SATAWU v Garvas 2013 1 
SA 83 (CC) par 143; and S v Sengama 2013 2 SACR 377 (SCA).   
107 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 30. 
108 Panamo SCA case (n 11) par 31.  
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altogether. That result is consistent with the injunction in s 5 of the Act that its 
provisions be interpreted in such a manner as to give effect to the purposes set out in s 
7, one of which, as I said at the outset, is to provide for the efficient rescue and 
recovery of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and 
interests of all relevant stakeholders.” 
 
For the above reasons, the Court concluded that Khumalo J erred in granting the declaratory 
order confirming the lapsing of the resolution and termination of the business rescue 
proceedings. The Supreme Court of Appeal, therefore, overruled the High Court’s decision. 
  
On final analysis of both judgments, the most important implication that emerged is regarding 
the principles of interpretation of legislation, especially with regard to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s judgment. It is submitted that this judgment is quite progressive and its implications 
are beneficial to the development of the law. On the other hand, the High Court judgment 
incorrectly enforced the law and restrictively interpreted the provisions of section 129(3) and 
(4) as they stood. What made this case particularly interesting is that the applicants who 
sought the order to declare the whole business rescue proceedings void were the same parties 
who voted for the commencement of business rescue proceedings.109 
 
4.5 Dealing with non-compliance of section 129 of the Act after Panamo: Alderbaran 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Bouwer   
In order to understand the effects and changes brought about by the decision in Panamo, this 
paragraph will briefly discuss the recent case of Alderbaran,110 which upheld the same 
principle that was laid down in Panamo – namely that only a court order can terminate 
business rescue proceedings including proceedings where time limits were not complied with. 
  
This case was an application brought by Alderbaran (Pty) Ltd, the first applicant 
(“Alderbaran”), and Faizel Noor, the second applicant, in his capacity as the business rescue 
practitioner of Alderbaran (“Faizel Noor”), to interdict the transfer to the third respondent, 
Trade Off 118 (Pty) Ltd (“Trade Off”), pursuant to a sale in execution, of an immovable 
                                              
109 Panamo SCA (n 11) par 1; and see Loubser “The business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act 2008: 
Concerns and questions: Part 1” 2010 TSAR 501 510. 
110 Alderbaran (Pty) Ltd and Another v Bouwer and Others (19992/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 38; [2018] 3 All SA 
71 (WCC); 2018 5 SA 215 (WCC). 
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property belonging to Alderbaran, and to declare such transfer unlawful in terms of section 
133 of the Act on the grounds that Alderbaran was in business rescue. The second application 
was a counter-application brought by the first respondent  Gideon Bouwer (“Bouwer”), being 
the execution creditor in respect of the aforementioned sale in execution, for the setting aside 
of the resolution placing Alderbaran under business rescue and the termination of the 
business rescue in terms of section 130 of the Act.  
 
Alderbaran purchased the property from Bouwer in 2014 in terms of a written agreement 
which stipulated a purchase price of R 1 000 000.00 payable by a way of a deposit of R 50 
000.00 and the balance payable over five years in monthly instalments. A mortgage bond was 
registered over the property in favour of Bouwer as security for Alderbaran’s obligations in 
respect of the balance of the purchase price. Bouwer sued for payment of the balance of the 
purchase price and obtained default judgment against Alderbaran on 25 April 2016 in court 
for payment of the amount of R 950 000.00, plus interest and costs. Pursuant thereto the 
property was attached and advertised for sale in execution on 15 September 2016. 
 
On 31 August 2016 Alderbaran launched an application for the rescission of the default 
judgment as well as the setting aside of any warrant of execution issued in respect of the 
property and the staying of any sale in execution pending the determination of the rescission 
application. As a result, the sale in execution scheduled for 15 September 2016 did not 
proceed.  
 
On 13 September 2016 the court dismissed the rescission application. On 13 September 2016, 
the same day the rescission application was dismissed, Shaheed Noor, the sole director of 
Alderbaran, passed a resolution in terms of section 129(1) of the Act to place Alderbaran 
under business rescue (“the first resolution”). He however failed to serve affected persons and 
to appoint the business rescue practitioner following the prescribed procedures. He further 
failed to furnish a statement upon which the resolution was founded. The appointment was 
not published according to the prescribed methods. Bouwer objected to the validity of the 
resolution based on non-compliance with the requirements of section 129(5) which resulted 
in the resolution lapsing and becoming a nullity. 
 
Shaheed Noor then passed another resolution on the 16 August 2017 Alderbaran, in terms of 
section 129(1) of the Act to place the Alderbaran in business rescue (“the second 
 29 
 
resolution”). The second resolution was supported by an affidavit deposed to by Shaheed 
Noor on 14 August 2017. The court found that the resort to business rescue was not genuine 
and was a delaying tactic aimed solely at preventing the transfer of the property in 
satisfaction of the judgment debt. It refused to halt the transfer of the property and dismissed 
the application for rescission of the judgment. 
 
The court found that both Shaheed and Faizel Noor were guilty of an abuse of the business 
rescue process. The court found that Shaheed Noor did not act in good faith in passing the 
first resolution. The court held that Faizel Noor’s conduct was equally reprehensible. He took 
no steps whatsoever to comply with the requirements of the Act in relation to the first 
resolution, and no attempt had been made to explain his conduct. The court held that the 
inference was inescapable that he had no intention of implementing the business rescue 
pursuant to the first resolution, and that he was a party to Shaheed Noor’s stratagem to 
prevent Bouwer from executing the default judgment in order to preserve the property in the 
name of Alderbaran.  
 
The court, following similar principles to those followed in the Panamo case, declared the 
first resolution a nullity, which as a result terminated the business rescue proceedings. The 
court also declared the sale of the immovable property valid. It is clear that, even though the 
Act stipulated that non-compliance of the provisions of section 129 of the Act would nullify 
the business rescue proceedings, the principle laid down in the Panamo case is that business 
rescue proceedings will only terminate if the resolution is set aside by a court.  
 
PART 5 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the cases considered above that the interpretation of section 129 is often 
problematic. This is because different facts lead to different interpretations, which result not 
only in confusion, but also in potential loopholes for abuse of the business rescue process by 
opportunistic, financially distressed companies, who seek to benefit from legal technicalities. 
 
In the Panamo case the Supreme Court of Appeal finally had the chance to consider such a 
scenario and bring about legal certainty. The court, however, created further uncertainty by 
holding that, despite the fact that the board resolution had lapsed in the event that the 
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company had not complied with the prescribed procedure, the business rescue procedures had 
not terminated. Therefore the business rescue procedure could be terminated only by an order 
of court, in terms of section 130(5), on the grounds of non-compliance and if, in addition, it 
could be shown that it would be just and equitable for the business rescue proceedings to end. 
 
To achieve this conclusion, the court changed the wording of section 130(5)(a) by replacing 
the word “or” before subsection 130(5)(a)(ii) with “and”. In so doing, the court removed a 
separate and potentially very useful ground for setting aside an otherwise valid board 
resolution to start business rescue procedures and denied affected persons of an incredible 
weapon to battle the broad abuse of business rescue procedures. It also became considerably 
difficult for the affected persons to acquire a court order putting aside a legitimate board 
resolution to begin the business rescue procedures. Aside from demonstrating that the 
company is not financially troubled, or that there is no sensible prospect of rescue, affected 
persons additionally need to demonstrate that it would be generally just and fair to set aside 
the resolution.111 
 
The Supreme Court Appeal’s decision therefore created new loopholes. In spite of the fact 
that the court was firmly influenced by its desire to counteract the abuse of business rescue 
procedures in this specific case, the judgment had clearly opened new routes to far more 
serious occasions of abuse. This has created uncertainty over the definite status and fate of a 
company in circumstances where the business rescue has slipped by, but is unable to comply 
with the procedural requirements and a court has not yet put it aside.  
 
PART 6 
 
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in this matter should have played a more significant role in 
guarding against restrictive interpretations of the legislation. The provisions of the legislation 
must, therefore, be purposefully interpreted, to accommodate and promote the objectives 
which the legislation was enacted for. It is submitted that the court, when dealing with these 
matters, must not consider certain provisions in isolation, but read the text as a whole. It is 
                                              
111 Loubser “Nienakoming van die voorgeskrewe prosedures na indiening van ’n direksiebesluit om met 
ondernemingsredding te begin: Is Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel die (regte) antwoord?” 2016, Volume 13 
Number 3 Litnet Akademies  845.  
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further submitted that, where the provisions of the legislation conflict with one another, such 
provisions must be reconciled to benefit all the parties involved.  
 
The court itself, however, should guard against legislating and should instead interpret the 
legislation. This is exactly what the Supreme Court of Appeal has done in this case. Although 
there may possibly be grounds for advocating amendments to section 129, to lessen the 
procedural burden and risks of non-compliance for companies, this is the task of the 
legislature and not the courts.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
112 Subramanian “Ground-breaking judgement as court clarifies the procedural requirements in section 129 of 
the companies act 71 of 2008: Panamo Properties v Nel NNO 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA)” 2017 Obiter 210. 
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